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§ 1 Introduction
In economics and game theory, information is usually modeled as signals on, or partitions
of, a state space. For example, suppose a decision maker (DM) is evaluating the possibility
of investing in a certain asset. There is a set Ω, the elements of which are interpreted as
states of nature. The asset’s rate of return is unknown to DM; but she has access to her
favorite financial analyst’s forecast, who announces a rate of return Y (ω) for each ω in
Ω—we call the function Y a signal. For each announcement y, DM will only know that
some ω with y = Y (ω) has occurred. Therefore, the signal Y generates a partition of Ω,
which is the informational content of Y .
Still, it is very common in finance and statistics, but also in economics, to represent DM’s
information as a σ-algebra of subsets of Ω; this is because we need σ-algebras to use the
machinery of probability theory. There are three different ways in which σ-algebras are
used in association with information. First, given a signal Y , the smallest σ-algebra
for which Y is measurable is often used (for example in the computation of conditional
expectations). Second, the σ-algebra generated by Y ’s partition is used (as in Magill and
Quinzii (1996)). Finally, sometimes a collection of σ-algebras is taken as the primitive
set of information structures (Allen 1983, Allen 1986, Stinchcombe 1990). In all these
cases, a σ-algebra is more informative than another if it contains more sets, i.e. if more
sets are measurable.
Blackwell’s (1951) theorem says that, given two signals Y and Z, Y is preferred to Z by
every DM if and only if Y ’s partition is finer than Z’s partition. We ask the following
question: Given two signals Y and Z, is it true that Y is preferred to Z by every DM if
and only if the σ-algebra of Y is finer than the σ-algebra of Z, for some natural definition
of “the σ-algebra of?” In other words, do the σ-algebras usually associated to a signal
preserve their informativeness? We provide the following results.
First, we show that Blackwell’s theorem does not hold if information is modeled as σ-
algebras in the usual way. Given one signal Y that is more informative than a signal Z,
we show that the partition induced by Y does not, in general, generate a finer σ−algebra
than the partition induced by Z. 1 We show that there is a loss of information when one
goes from signals to the σ-algebras they generate. The reason for this loss is that if a
DM’s information allows her to decide whether any member of an arbitrary collection
of sets is true or not, then she can decide whether their union is true or not. Since σ-
algebras require that this be true only for countable collections of sets, the “knowledge”
of sets that can only be built as arbitrary unions of elements in the partition is lost.
The loss of information in going from partitions to σ-algebras makes a difference in
decision problems. We present a simple example where a DM must first choose a signal
1This statement is still true when we consider the smallest σ-algebras that make, respectively, Y and
Z measurable, as well. This is discussed below.
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and then, after observing its value, chooses to invest in a risky asset or in a riskless bond.
If σ-algebras are used to model information DM chooses the least informative signal.
We show that the loss of information in passing from signals to σ-algebras can be avoided
by associating a non-conventional σ-algebra to the signals. This is the σ-algebra of ar-
bitrary unions of elements of the partition. Of course, this σ-algebra coincides with the
σ-algebra generated by the signal’s partition when the partition has a countable number of
elements. Hence information is preserved exactly if, and only if, partitions have a count-
able number of elements (as in Magill and Quinzii (1996)). The information-preserving
σ-algebra has the disadvantage that it has no clear links to the spaces’ topological proper-
ties (like the Borel), and that it may be too large for some countably additive measures to
be well-defined. Still, it is the only σ-algebra construction that preserves information—
we show that Blackwell’s theorem holds when the σ-algebra associated to signal is the
information-preserving σ-algebra.
Second, we show that expectations and conditional expectations depend on the choice
of σ-algebra that should be associated to a signal. This is important because, in the
same model, different σ-algebras may yield different conclusions. We provide a simple
characterization of when the model is robust to the choice of which σ-algebra should be
associated to a signal.
Authors who use σ-algebras to model information do so for technical convenience, but
they are apparently unaware that σ-algebras are unrelated to Blackwell-informativeness.
For example, consider the following quote from Durrett (1996, p. 221), the leading
graduate textbook in probability theory (F is a σ-algebra): “Intuitively we think of F as
describing the information we have at our disposal—for each A ∈ F , we know whether or
not A has occurred.” Or, in her seminal work on information in economics, Allen (1983, p.
66) “The abstract measure space (Ω,F) is arbitrary and can be interpreted to encompass
notions of information partitions, signals, noisy observations, etc.” The finance literature
presents the same heuristics, “The filtration generated by a given stochastic process may
be treated as a model of the information received through time by observing the process.”,
(Duffie 1988, p. 133). The heuristic is inaccurate because a σ-algebra is the collection
of sets of which DM is able to make a probabilistic judgment, not the sets that DM can
decide if they are true.
§ 2 Non-equivalence
This section is organized as follows. In § 2.0 we introduce some standard definitions
and notation. In § 2.1 and § 2.3 we show that signals and σ-algebras are incompatible
as models of information. In § 2.2 and § 2.4 we discuss a simple example where, if the
σ-algebras approach is used, we predict that a DM will choose the least informative of
two signals. In § 2.5 we explain why information is lost in the passage from signals to
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σ-algebras, and we show that closedness with respect to arbitrary unions is necessary
and sufficient to preserve information. In § 2.6 we argue that focusing on countable
state-spaces may not be a solution in many interesting contexts.
§ 2.0. A partition τ of a set Ω is a collection of pairwise disjoint subsets whose union is
Ω; note that for each state of nature ω there is a unique element of τ that contains ω. A
decision maker whose information is represented by τ is informed only that the element
of τ that contains the true state of nature has occurred. In other words, the decision
maker cannot distinguish between states that belong to the same element of τ . If Ω is a
set, and Y : Ω→ R is a function, define the partition PY of Ω associated to Y by
PY =
{
Y −1(x) : x ∈ R} .
If τ , τ ′ are partitions, say that τ ′ is finer than τ if, for every A ∈ τ ′, there is B in τ such
that A ⊆ B. We say that a signal Y is more (Blackwell) informative than a signal
Z if PY is finer than PZ .
A σ-algebra of subsets of a state-space Ω is a collection of sets that contains Ω and that
is closed under countable unions and formation of complements. For any collection C
of subsets of Ω, the σ-algebra generated by C, denoted σ(C), is the smallest σ-algebra
that contains C. A pair (Ω,F), where F is a σ-algebra of subsets of Ω, is a measurable
space. Let (Ω,F) and (Θ,G) be two measurable spaces. A function Y : Ω → Θ is
measurable if Y −1 (B) ∈ F for all B ∈ G. The σ-algebra generated by Y , denoted
σ(Y ), is the smallest σ-algebra for which Y is measurable.
A probability space is a triple (Ω,F , P ) where F is a σ-algebra of subsets of Ω and P
is a probability measure. Let G be a sub-σ-algebra of F , the conditional expectation,
E(f |G), of any measurable function f : Ω→ R is the equivalence class of G-measurable
functions g : Ω → R that satisfy ∫
A
fdP =
∫
A
gdP for all A ∈ G. Following standard
practice, if Y is a signal we define E(f |Y ) = E(f |σ(Y )) and E(f |PY ) = E(f |σ(PY )).
The following lemma is useful, its proof follows directly from checking definitions, and
therefore omitted.
Lemma A. Let τ be a partition of Ω, then σ(τ) is the collection of sets A such that A
or Ac is a countable union of elements of τ .
The following observation (obvious in light of Lemma A) clarifies the interpretation of
the σ-algebra generated by a partition.
Observation. Let (Ω,F , P ) be a probability space. If pi is a partition of Ω, all of whose
elements are measurable, and such that P (A) = 0 for all A ∈ pi; then σ(pi) is trivial, that
is P (A) ∈ {0, 1} for all A ∈ σ(pi).
§ 2.1. Let the state of the world be a number between 0 and 1, so that Ω = [0, 1], and
suppose that a DM can observe one of two signals Y and Z about the state of the world.
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Suppose that Y is given by Y (ω) = ω for all ω in [0, 1] . The signal Z, in turn, is
Z (ω) =
{
0 if ω < 1
2
1 otherwise
Of course, Y is more Blackwell informative than Z, Y ’s partition is PY = {{ω} : 0 ≤ ω ≤ 1},
Z’s partition is PZ = {[0, 1/2) ; [1/2, 1]}, and Y ’s partition is finer than Z’s. By using Y
DM would be able to distinguish between more states of nature. We shall show that the
σ-algebras associated to PY and PZ do not preserve this informational ranking.
Let us represent the informational content of signals Y and Z by σ-algebras. When
partitions PY and PZ are the primitive informational structure, the natural candidates
are σ(PY ) and σ(PZ), the σ-algebras generated by PY and PZ , respectively (Magill and
Quinzii 1996). It is somewhat more frequent to use the σ-algebra generated by the signal
viewed as a function, here σ(Y ) and σ(Z) (see § 2.0). We show below that, in that case,
problems in addition to those highlighted in this section appear. Further, some authors
avoid uncountable partitions like PY , we discuss this in § 2.6.
Now, (by Lemma A in § 2.0), σ(PY ) is the collection of sets that are countable, or have a
countable complement, while σ(PZ) = {∅; [0, 1/2) ; [1/2, 1] ; Ω}. Thus, σ(PY ) is not finer
than σ(PZ) (in fact, σ(PY ) and σ(PZ) are incomparable), and Y is not more informative
than Z when the σ-algebras model is used.
To the best of our knowledge, that the two notions of informativeness are incompatible
is not known. To make this point, note that, for example, Yannelis (1991) claims that
finer partitions generate finer sigma algebras.
§ 2.2 The following example shows that, in a standard decision problem, if σ-algebras
are used to represent the informational content of two signals, DM will choose the least
informative signal.
Let Ω, Y , and Z be as in § 2.1. Endow Ω with the Borel σ-algebra; σ(PY ) and σ(PZ) are
sub-σ-algebras of the Borel. Let P be the Lebesgue measure on Ω.
Let X be the rate of return of some asset, suppose X(ω) = ω, and suppose there is a
bond that yields a return of 3/8 in every state of the world. Let the preferences of DM
be such that she only cares about the expected return to her investment. After learning
the value of her signal, she uses her prediction of X to decide whether to invest in the
asset or in the bond.
We show below that E(X|PY ) = 1/2 a.s. (specifically, that any version of E(X|PY )
equals a.s. the constant function 1/2). It is immediate that
E(X|PZ) (ω) =
{
1/4 if ω < 1/2
3/4 otherwise
Now it is easy to check that DM will prefer signal Z over Y . In almost every state of
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the world E(X|PY ) is larger than the return to the bond, so if DM has signal Y she will
a.s. buy the asset. The ex-ante expected utility of choosing signal Y is thus 1/2. On
the other hand, if DM uses Z then she will buy the bond when ω < 1/2 and the asset if
ω ≥ 1/2, and will thus get a utility of (3/8)(1/2) + (3/4)(1/2) = 9/16. Hence, while Y
is more informative than Z it is worth less to DM.
We now show that, indeed, E(X|PY ) = 1/2 a.s., that is, that any version of E(X|PY )
is a.s. equal to 1/2. Let f : Ω → R be any version of E(X|PY ). We shall show
that f−1(1/2,+∞) and f−1(−∞, 1/2) are countable sets; this suffices as countable sets
have probability zero. We first show that, for arbitrary natural n, f−1
[
1
2
+ 1
n
,+∞)
is countable. Suppose it is uncountable, then (f−1
[
1
2
+ 1
n
,+∞))c is countable, be-
cause f is σ(PY )-measurable and σ(PY ) is the countable-co-countable σ-algebra. Then
f−1
[
1
2
+ 1
n
,+∞) has measure one and we obtain,
1
2
=
∫
f−1[ 12 +
1
n
,+∞)
f(ω)dP (ω) ≥
∫
f−1[ 12 +
1
n
,+∞)
(
1
2
+
1
n
)
dP =
1
2
+
1
n
,
a contradiction. That f−1
(
1
2
,+∞) is countable follows, as
f−1 (1/2,+∞) =
⋃
n
f−1 [1/2 + 1/n,+∞) .
Similarly, f−1 (−∞, 1/2) is countable.
§ 2.3. We can view signals Y and Z as random variables, and compare the generated
σ-algebras. In the case of Y and Z from § 2.1, the σ-algebra generated by Y is indeed
larger than the one generated by Z. This is not the general case, though.
Let F be any σ-algebra of subsets of R such that {1} ∈ F 6= 2R. If Y : R → R
is the identity, and Z = χE for some E ∈ 2R\F , we obtain σ(Y ) = F , and σ(Z) =
{∅, E, Ec,R}. Thus σ(Y ) and σ(Z) are not comparable, while Y is more Blackwell
informative than Z. That is, Blackwell’s theorem fails when the σ-algebra associated to
the signals is σ(Y ) and σ(Z), respectively.
Example B is a concrete version of the above: There is a measurable space (Ω,F) and two
(Borel) signals Y, Z : Ω→ R such that Y is more informative than Z, but σ(Y ) and σ(Z)
are incomparable. The measure space that we use was used in the 40’s by Dieudonne´,
Doob, Kolmogorov to show that, if it is endowed with an extension of Lebesgue measure,
conditional probabilities may not exist (Blackwell 1956).
Example B. Let Ω = R, and let E ⊆ Ω have outer Lebesgue measure 1 and inner
Lebesgue measure 0 (e.g. see the construction in Theorem D, in §13 Halmos (1950)). Let
F on Ω be the σ-algebra generated by the Borel σ-algebra and E. Let Y, Z : Ω → R be
Z = χE, the indicator function of E, and Y be the identity, Y and Z are measurable.
Then, PZ = {E,Ec}, and PY = {{ω} : ω ∈ Ω}—signal Y is better than signal Z, since
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the partition it generates is finer. Now, σ(Z) = {∅, E, Ec,Ω}, and σ(Y ) is the Borel
σ-field on R. Thus σ(Z) * σ(Y ) and σ(Y ) * σ(Z) : σ(Y ) and σ(Z) are not comparable.
We should stress that, while the interpretation of σ(Y ) as the information content of Y
is emphasized in much of probability theory, we do not claim that the intuitions in the
large body of literature on e.g. martingales is false. We simply wish to point out some
inaccuracies in the heuristics behind the theory. In many common contexts no practical
problems arise: If {Xn}∞n=1 is a sequence of random variables on a probability space
(Ω,F , µ), the increasing sequence {σ(X1, . . . , Xn)}∞n=1 is said to represent the “unfolding
of information”. While the examples above show that σ(X1, . . . Xn) should not be called
“the information in periods 1, . . . n”, it is clear that information is increasing over time
(the partitions associated to (X1, . . . Xn) are finer for larger n).
Nevertheless, in interpreting σ(Y ) as information there are problems in addition to the
issues raised in § 2.1 (and discussed further in § 2.5). It is immediate to see the problem
with interpreting σ(Y ) as informational content of Y : σ(Y ) is the collection of sets
whose probability we can determine from the distribution of Y ; on the other hand, its
associated partition PY is the collection of sets A such that we can decide if A is true
or not from the value of Y . Moreover, the partition PY , Y ’s informational content, is
completely unrelated to the σ-algebra on the set where Y takes its values, while the
σ-algebra generated by Y is exactly the set of preimages through Y of all measurable
sets.
This point is clearer if we introduce a probability measure on [0, 1], let P be the Lebesgue
probability measure. Let Y and Z be as in § 2.1. Signal Y is such that σ(PY ) is trivial,
while σ(Y ) is the Borel σ-algebra, and thus for any λ ∈ (0, 1) there is E ∈ σ(Y ) with
P (E) = λ. The first reflects that Y will show than some element A ∈ PY occurred, which
has probability zero, and its complement Ac has probability one. On the other hand,
σ(Y ) reflects that the σ-algebra on the target space is so rich that one can obtain sets of
any measure, something quite unrelated to Y ’s informational content.
§ 2.4 The counter-intuitive prediction in § 2.2 obtains also when the informational content
of Y and Z is modeled by σ(Y ) and σ(Z). The source of the anomaly in § 2.3 is that
E(X|PY ) = 1/2. Is this also true when we use σ(Y ) to predict X? The answer is that
it depends on the σ-algebra on Y ’s target space. If R is endowed the Borel σ-algebra
then the identity is a version of E(X|σ(Y ), but if R is endowed with the σ-algebra of
countable sets or complements of countable sets, then every version of E(X|σ(Y ) must
equal 1/2 a.s.
Besides reiterating the point in § 2.3, this shows that, with probability 1, E(X|σ(Y ) may
be different if different σ-algebras are imposed on Y ’s target space. By changing the
σ-algebra on the signals’ target space we reverse DM’s preferences among the available
signals. Moreover, the σ-algebra on the target space does not have, in our opinion, a
natural interpretation. If we view this σ-algebra as a model of DM’s ability to “perceive”
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the values of the signals, then we run into the same problems as when we use σ-algebras
to model information on Ω. In particular, the ability to perceive is not closed under
arbitrary unions, see § 2.5.
§ 2.5. The problem presented in § 2.1 and § 2.3 has its origin in the construction of the
σ-algebras associated to a signal. If we instead construct σ-algebras by an operation that
exactly preserves the informational content of the signal, the problem does not arise, and
Blackwell’s theorem is recovered. For a signal Y, let σY be the collection of sets which
are arbitrary unions of elements in the partition PY . It is immediate to check that σY is
a σ-algebra.
Lemma C. Let Ω and Θ be two sets, and Y, Z two functions from Ω to Θ. Y is more
informative than Z if and only if σZ ⊆ σY .
Proof. If Y is more informative than Z, for every collection of sets {Ai} in PZ , there
exists a collection {Bi} in PY such that
⋃
iAi =
⋃
iBi, so σZ ⊆ σY . Suppose now that
σZ ⊆ σY , but that Y is not more informative than Z. This means that there exists a
set A in PZ such that for every collection {Bi} in PY , A 6=
⋃
iBi. Thus, A ∈ σZ , but
A /∈ σY , a contradiction. 
Lemma C and Blackwell’s theorem imply then,
Theorem D. Let Ω and Θ be two sets, and Y, Z two functions from Ω to Θ. Every DM
prefers Y over Z if and only if σZ ⊆ σY .
Why does the σY construction preserve information? If a DM’s information allows her to
decide if a member of an arbitrary collection of sets is true or not, then she can decide if
their union is true or not. Thus σY is obtained by adding all those sets that DM “knows”.
There is a problem in §2.1 because the σ-algebra generated by PY does not contain all
sets that are uncountable unions of elements of PY . Now, when Ω is finite or countably
infinite σY and σ(PY ) coincide, and more information translates into larger σ-algebras.
2
Allen (1983) (see also Stinchcombe (1990)) presents a model of information where the
set of primitive information structures is a collection of σ-algebras on a state space.
Our observations imply that, in order for a collection of σ-algebras to be interpreted as
information structures, they should be closed under arbitrary unions. This remark is
subject to the following qualification: Stinchcombe (1990) proves that, in certain well-
behaved spaces, a countably generated σ-algebra F can be identified with the partition
{∩ {B : B ∈ F , ω ∈ B} : ω ∈ Ω} of its atoms, and that all σ-algebras are “close” to a
countably generated σ-algebra. 3 In this particular sense, then, arbitrary σ-algebras
possess an informational content.
2This explains why authors that use finite state spaces, like Magill and Quinzii (1996), have a con-
sistent model of information, even though they go back and forth between partitions and σ-algebras.
3We are grateful to Maxwell Stinchcombe for pointing this out.
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§ 2.6 Many authors use a countable state space, or, with an uncountable state space,
focus only on finite or countable partitions. This practice avoids the problems that we
have pointed out, and probably people follow this practice because they are aware that
there are problems associated to uncountable partitions. To the best of our knowledge, no
one has identified the problems we point to, and their link to the modeling of information.
In fact, people normally rule out uncountable partitions without providing a justification
for doing so.
Many models require an uncountable number of states of nature. This is the case, for
example, of Savage’s model of decision under uncertainty (Fishburn 1970) or of games of
incomplete information (Mertens and Zamir 1985, Brandenburger and Dekel 1993). In
other models, an uncountable space is necessary to use calculus methods. If we wish to
model information as partitions in a model with an uncountable state space we cannot
restrict to countable partitions—we would really be considering a countable state space
by ruling out, among other things, that agents distinguish among an uncountable number
of states.
§ 3 Some additional problems and a fix
Let Y be a signal. If X is a random variable, we show in § 3.1 that E(X|Y ) and E(X|PY )
may differ, and in § 3.2 that E(X) may depend on whether σ(Y ) or σ(PY ) is used. The
source of this problem is, of course, that σ(Y ) and σ(PY ) differ; in § 3.3 we characterize
the cases when they do not differ, and show that no problem arises when partitions are
taken as primitives throughout.
§ 3.1. Let Ω = [0, 1], endowed with the Borel σ-algebra, and Y : Ω→ Ω be the identity.
Then, σ(Y ) is the Borel σ-algebra on Ω, and σ(PY ) is the collection of A ⊆ Ω such that
A or Ac is countable. Let X : Ω→ R be one-to-one, then X is a version of E(X|Y ) but
not of E(X|PY ), as X is not σ(PY )-measurable.
This example suggests that we may need to make a choice between E(X|Y ) and E(X|PY )
when modeling DM’s prediction of X based on the information in Y .
§ 3.2. Let Ω and Y be as in § 3.1, and let X be the identity too. Let P be the Lebesgue
(uniform) measure on (Ω, σ(Y )), and on (Ω, σ(PY )). We now show that E(X) depends
on whether Ω is endowed with σ(Y ) or σ(PY ). Denote by ΨF the collection of simple
functions when Ω is endowed with the σ-algebra F . Then,
sup
{ψ∈Ψσ(PY ):ψ≤X}
∫
ψ(ω)dP (ω) = 0 < 1/2 = sup
{ψ∈Ψσ(Y ):ψ≤X}
∫
ψ(ω)dP (ω).
Hence E(X) = 0 in (Ω, σ(PY ), P ), and E(X) = 1/2 in (Ω, σ(Y ), P ).
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§ 3.3. The source of these problems is the difference between σ(Y ) and σ(PY ). We can
fix these problems by taking partitions as basic throughout. If Y : Ω → Θ is a signal,
and pi a partition of Θ, we define P piY to be the partition formed by the preimages through
Y of the elements of pi; σY is, as before, the set of unions of elements in P
pi
Y .
Proposition E. Let Y : Ω → Θ and pi be a partition of Θ. If Θ is endowed with σ(pi),
σ(P piY ) = σ(Y ). If Θ is endowed with the σ-algebra of unions of elements of pi, then
σY = σ(Y ).
By different partitions on Θ we can study different degrees of “perceptiveness”, i.e. of
the quality of information in the signal’s target space. We always assume, though, that
pi consists of all singletons; in this case we can characterize fully the situations where
σ(PY ) = σ(Y ).
Proposition F. Let (Ω,F) and (Θ,G) be two measurable spaces, and let Y : Ω→ Θ be
onto. G is generated by the singletons in Θ if and only if σ(PY ) = σ(Y ). G = 2Θ if and
only if σY = σ(Y ).
We omit the proof of Proposition E because its proof is similar to the proofs of the only
if parts of Proposition F.
Proof of Proposition F: We shall first prove the first equivalence. Let pi be the
collection of all singletons in Θ, and G = σ (pi). Then, for all B ∈ PY , there is
{θ} ∈ pi such that B = Y −1(θ). Since {θ} ∈ σ(pi) we obtain B ∈ σ(Y ); hence
PY ⊆ σ(Y ), and σ(PY ) ⊆ σ(Y ). Let B ∈ σ(Y ), then there is A ∈ σ(pi) with B =
Y −1(A). If A = ∪{Ai : i = 1, 2, . . .} with Ai ∈ pi for i = 1, 2, . . ., then B = Y −1(A) =
∪{Y −1(Ai) : i = 1, 2, . . .}. Then, B ∈ σ(PY ), as Y −1(Ai) ∈ σ(PY ) for i = 1, 2, . . ..
By Lemma A, if A is not a countable collection of elements of pi, Ac is, and thus Bc ∈
σ(PY ), so B ∈ σ(PY ). Hence σ(PY ) = σ(Y ).
Suppose now that σ(PY ) = σ(Y ). For all A ∈ G, B = Y −1 (A) belongs to σ(PY ).
Suppose B is the countable union of elements of PY . Then, Y (B) = A is the countable
union of singletons in pi, and thus A ∈ σ (pi) . If B is uncountable, Bc is countable and
Y (Bc) = Ac is the countable union of singletons in pi, and thus Ac, A ∈ σ (pi) . This
shows that G ⊆ σ (pi) .
To show that σ (pi) ⊆ G, we will show that for all θ ∈ Θ, {θ} ∈ G. Let B = Y −1 (θ) ∈
PY ∈ σ(PY ) = σ(Y ). Since σ(Y ) is the σ-algebra of all the preimages of all G-measurable
sets, there is some A ∈ G such that Y (B) = A. But then A = {θ}.
To prove the second statement let G = 2Θ and let A ∈ σ(Y ). Then A = Y −1(B) =
∪{Y −1(θ) : θ ∈ B} for some B ∈ G. Now, Y −1(θ) ∈ PY for every θ ∈ B, and thus
A ∈ σY by definition of σY . Hence, σ(Y ) ⊆ σY . To prove σY ⊆ σ(Y ), let A ∈ σY . Then
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A = Y −1(B) = ∪{Y −1(θ) : θ ∈ B}, for some B ⊆ Θ. Since B ∈ G, A ∈ σ(Y ). Thus
G = 2Ω implies that σY = σ(Y ).
Let σY = σ(Y ) and B ⊆ Θ. Then, Y −1(B) = ∪{Y −1(θ) : θ ∈ B} ∈ σY , by definition of
σY . Then Y
−1(B) ∈ σ(Y ), so there is C ∈ G with Y −1(C) = Y −1(B), but then B = C
as Y is onto. Thus B ∈ G. 
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